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Abstract  
The literature on trade openness, economic development, and the environment is largely 
inconclusive about the environmental consequences of trade. This study review previous 
studies focusing on treating trade and income as endogenous and estimating the overall 
impact of trade openness on environmental quality using the instrumental variables 
technique. The results show that whether or not trade has a beneficial effect on the 
environment varies depending on the pollutant and the country. Trade is found to benefit the 
environment in OECD countries. It has detrimental effects, however, on sulfur dioxide (SO2) 
and carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions in non-OECD countries, although it does lower 
biochemical oxygen demand (BOD) emissions in these countries. The results also find the 
impact is large in the long term, after the dynamic adjustment process, although it is small in 
the short term. 
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1. Introduction 
The environmental outcome of trade liberalization has been one of the most 
important questions in trade policy for the past 10 years (see Copeland and Taylor, 
2005; Taylor, 2004; Managi and Kumar, 2009). Theoretically, openness to 
international trade is expected to have both positive and negative effects on 
the environment (Copeland and Taylor, 2005). Empirically, statistical 
evidence about the relationship between international trade openness and 
environmental quality has been accumulating (see, e.g., Antweiler et al., 
2001; Harbaugh et al., 2002; Cole and Elliott, 2003; Frankel and Rose, 2005). 
Managi et al. (2009) extends the literature by showing the sensitivity of results to 
differences between OECD and developing countries, dynamic adjustment process, and 
addressing the endogeneity problems. Following Managi et al. (2009), we provide review 
of analysis and results.   
Antweiler et al. (2001) first provide the theoretical framework to empirically explore 
the determinants of emissions and to successfully decompose them into scale, technique, 
and composition effects. The scale effect refers to the effect of an increase in production 
(e.g., GDP) on emissions. The technique effect indicates the negative impact of income 
on emission intensity. This refers to the effect of more stringent environmental 
regulations, which promote the employment of more environmentally-friendly 
production methods and which are put in place as additional income increases the 
demand for a better environment. The composition effect explains how emissions are 
affected by the composition of output (i.e., the structure of the industry), which is 
determined by the degree of trade openness as well as by the comparative advantage of 
the country. This effect could be positive or negative, depending on the country’s 
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resource abundance and the strength of its environmental policy. These are called the 
capital–labor effect (KLE) and the environmental regulation effect (ERE), respectively.1  
Since trade openness could increase production and income, it affects emissions 
through the scale effect and the technique effect (Antweiler et al., 2001). Hereafter, we 
call these effects the trade-induced scale effect and the trade-induced technique effect. 
Antweiler et al. (2001) estimate how trade openness (increase in trade intensity) and 
GDP (or per capita income) affect pollution by using data on sulfur dioxide (SO2) 
concentrations. They find that SO2 concentrations increase as GDP rises (i.e., positive 
scale effect), decrease as per capita income rises (i.e., negative technique effect), and 
decrease as trade openness rises (i.e., negative composition effect). Similarly, Cole and 
Elliott (2003) analyze country-level emissions per capita of sulfur dioxide (SO2), carbon 
dioxide (CO2), nitrogen oxides (NOx), and biochemical oxygen demand (BOD)) and 
estimate the net of the scale effect and the technique effect, and the composition effect.2  
However, these previous studies do not consider the endogeneity problem 3  in 
                                                  
1 Since there is a strong correlation between a sector’s capital intensity and its pollution intensity (Cole 
and Elliott, 2003), the capital-intensive goods can be considered as pollution goods. Therefore, countries 
where the capital-labor ratio is relatively high are expected to have a comparative advantage in 
capital-intensive goods and thus, to produce more emissions. Trade openness would strengthen the effects 
of this comparative advantage and of any between-country differences in environmental policy on the 
industrial structure. Therefore, more openness would increase the production share of the goods in which 
these countries have a comparative advantage (i.e., capital-intensive goods). On the other hand, trade 
openness would reduce the comparative advantage of capital-intensive goods in countries that have 
relatively strict environmental policies (i.e., higher income countries) while increasing the comparative 
advantage of such goods in countries with less stringent environmental regulations (i.e., laxity is a source 
of comparative advantage). As a result, the production of capital-intensive goods under more stringent 
regulations decreases, and the emissions decrease. This is called the ERE, or, in other words, the pollution 
haven effect. The net effect of the composition effect as a result of trade openness could therefore be 
positive or negative, depending on the relative sizes of the KLE and the ERE. 
2 The scale effect and the technique effect are not separated in Cole and Elliott (2003) and Cole (2006) 
because real GDP per capita is used as a proxy for both production and per capita income level. Therefore, 
the net of the scale effect and the technique effect is estimated and named the scale-technique effect. We 
call the net of the trade-induced scale effect and the trade-induced technique effect as the trade-induced 
scale-technique effect. 
3 It should also be noted that this problem causes the biased estimation results. Trade openness is also 
considered to be the source of the other engdogeneity problem, which is not addressed in the previous 
studies. 
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production (or income) and, thus, do not treat the effect of trade openness on production 
(or income) explicitly. Therefore, the effects of trade openness on emissions via income 
and production changes (i.e., the trade-induced scale and technique effects) cannot be 
compared to the composition effect induced by trade. As a result, we cannot infer the 
overall environmental consequences of trade as a summation of these effects. For 
instance, in the case of Cole and Elliott’s (2003) finding on SO2 emissions, in which an 
increase in income reduces emissions (i.e., negative net scale and technique effects) 
while trade openness increases emissions (i.e., positive composition effects), we are not 
able to judge whether the overall sign of the effect of trade on emissions is positive or 
negative. 
 Furthermore, we need to note that an increase in income (or production) 
associated with trade openness might affect the composition effect. For example, the 
composition effect resulting from the ERE might be larger under more stringent policies. 
However, since the endogeneity of income is not considered in these previous studies, 
estimates of the composition effect induced by trade do not include this effect. 
 To clarify the short- and long-term effects of trade on the environment, we also 
apply a dynamic model to consider an adjustment process. Since the former studies do 
not consider the dynamic adjustment process, we must consider their results primarily 
to be short-term effects. This may explain why the effects of trade on the environment 
that they calculate are rather small.  
Our main findings are by providing results of Managi et al. (2009), 
(1) Both the data coverage and the estimation method affect the estimation results. 
Thus, to obtain appropriate estimation results, it is important to address the 
endogeneity problems and to have more data coverage.  
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(2) Trade openness decreases BOD emissions both in OECD and non-OECD countries. 
However, it increases SO2 and CO2 emissions in non-OECD countries, while it 
decreases them in OECD countries. 
(3) There is a distinct difference between the short-term and long-term effects of trade 
openness on the environment, implying that it is important to take dynamics into 
consideration. The difference in the short-term and long-term overall effect of the 
trade openness is large in the case of SO2 in OECD countries and SO2 and CO2 in 
non-OECD countries. On the other hand, the difference is relatively small in the 
other case. 
 
2. Model 
2.1  Empirical Strategy 
Antweiler et al. (2001) analyze SO2 concentrations in 43 countries from 1971 to 
1996. They find positive scale effects, negative technique effects, and negative 
trade-induced composition effects. Thus, since the technique effects dominate the scale 
effects on average, they conclude that trade openness is associated with reduced 
pollution. Similarly, Cole and Elliott (2003) and Cole (2006) analyze country-level 
emissions (SO2, CO2, NOx, and BOD) and energy consumption per capita, and they 
estimate the scale-technique effects and composition effects. Their findings generally 
support those of Antweiler et al. (2001) for SO2. The results suggest that greater 
openness reduces BOD emissions per capita but is likely to increase NOx and CO2 
emissions and energy use. 
While these studies analyze how trade openness and income affect the environment, 
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we are not able to find a causal relationship if we treat trade openness as exogenous.4 
Therefore, in addition to addressing the endogeneity of income, the endogeneity of trade 
needs to be modeled to analyze the consequences of trade for the environment 
(Copeland and Taylor, 2005; Frankel and Rose, 2005).  
Frankel and Rose (2005) consider trade openness and income endogenously. They 
address the potential simultaneity of trade, environmental quality, and income by 
applying instrumental variables estimations using a gravity model of bilateral trade 
and endogenous growth from neoclassical growth equations. It should be noted that 
they do not derive these estimations from a theoretical model like Antweiler et al. 
(2001) and thus that they do not consider the decomposed effects. They estimate an 
environmental quality equation, a trade equation, and an income equation to test a 
causal relationship between trade and environmental outcomes. Using cross section 
data from 41 countries in 1990 and looking at the sign of the openness variable, they 
support the optimistic view that trade reduces sulfur dioxide emissions.5 
In Managi et al. (2009), they use a larger and more globally representative sample, 
especially including more developing countries, of many local and global emissions than 
are reflected in previous studies. Panel data used in Managi et al. (2009) are the SO2 
and CO2 emissions of 88 countries from 1973 to 2000 and the BOD emissions of 83 
countries from 1980 to 2000.  
In econometric models, serial correlation must be considered because the 
                                                  
4 See Frankel and Romer (1999) and Noguer and Siscart (2005) for recent studies that treat trade as 
endogenous and that estimate the impact of trade on income using instrumental variables. 
5 Some of the variables used in Frankel and Rose (2005) are excluded from our estimated results in this 
chapter because they are not statistically significant or because we are not able to explain the intuition 
behind the results regarding those variables. Instead, we follow Cole and Elliott (2003). For another 
application that analyzes the causal effect of domestic state-level trade flows on toxic emissions in the US, 
see Chintrakarn and Millimet (2006). 
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environmental and output dependent variables have relatively monotonic trends.6 
However, previous studies of international trade and the environment do not control for 
this factor when analyzing panel data. It should be noted that a dynamic generalized 
method of moments (GMM) estimation of panel data applied to a dynamic model is 
useful both to correct for serial correlation and to analyze both short- and long-term 
effects of trade openness on the environment.  
Extending the previous studies in several ways can produce a broader view of 
environmental consequences, and, therefore, we might come to different conclusions 
about the linkage between international trade and environmental quality. 
2.2   Model 
Managi et al. (2009) considers the endogeneity of trade openness and income 
and then estimates an environmental quality equation. Here, we focus on the 
environmental quality equation and income equation. We elaborate on the trade 
openness equation in Appendix A. 
2.2.1 Environmental Quality Equation 
Managi et al. (2009) employs a specification similar to Cole and Elliott (2003), 
under which the determinants of emissions can be decomposed into scale-technique and 
composition effects. We add a lagged term of the dependent variable and international 
protocol dummies are included to control for the effect of the dynamic process 
(Arellano and Bond, 1991). 
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6 While there are other factors such as omitted variable bias, we do not bias our model. 
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1 1 1it i itε η ν= + ,       (1) 
where Eit denotes emissions (SO2, CO2, and BOD) per capita of country i in year t (for 
example, kilograms of sulfur dioxide per capita), and S is GDP per capita. GDP per 
capita and its quadratic are intended to capture the scale-technique effect. T is defined as 
the ratio of aggregate exports and imports to GDP, which, as in the growth literature, 
proxies trade openness (or trade intensity) (Antweiler et al., 2001; Frankel and Rose, 
2005)7; K/L denotes a country’s capital–labor ratio; RK/L denotes a country’s relative 
capital–labor ratio; RS is relative GDP per capita8; and 1ε  is an error term and consists 
of an individual country effect 1η  and a random disturbance 1ν . 
The terms of itS  and 
2
itS  on the right hand side in (1) reflect the effects of 
income and production on emissions. From this, we expect to estimate the 
scale-technique effect (Cole and Elliott, 2003). The terms of itH , itKYOTO  and 
itHW &  are additional technique effects. These terms represent international 
environmental treaties for emission reductions. In the case of SO2, two international 
environmental treaties are included in the regression. H denotes the Helsinki dummy, 
where 1 indicates that the country has ratified the Helsinki Protocol and 0 indicates 
otherwise, and O denotes the Oslo dummy, where 1 indicates ratification of the Oslo 
Protocol and 0 indicates otherwise.9 Similarly, the Kyoto Protocol ( itKYOTO ) and the 
Protocol on Water and Health ( itHW & ) are considered for the cases of CO2 and BOD, 
respectively, where detailed explanations are provided later. We should note that the 
                                                  
7 Managi et al. (2009) focuses on trade exposure rather than trade liberalization. See Ederington et al. 
(2004) for the direct impact of liberalization on polluting activities. They study the effect of reductions in 
US tariffs schedules on the output of pollution intensive industries. 
8 To show a country’s comparative advantage, a country’s capital–labor ratio and per capita income levels 
are expressed relative to the world average for each year (Cole and Elliott, 2003). 
9 The 1985 Helsinki Protocol on the reduction of sulfur emissions and their transboundary fluxes by at 
least 30 percent entered into force in 1987. The 1994 Oslo Protocol on the further reduction of sulfur 
emissions is a successor to the Helsinki Protocol and entered into force in 1998. 
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decision of a country to ratify these protocols cannot be treated as exogenous because 
this decision is likely to be affected by that country’s economic conditions (Beron et al., 
2003; Murdoch et al., 2003). Therefore, to address self-selection bias, the predicted 
probability of reaching the ratification stage is calculated using probit estimation and is 
used for these dummy variables for the countries participating in the negotiations of 
these treaties.10 
The terms excluding 1c , 1ln −itE , itS , 
2
itS , itH , itO , itKYOTO  and itHW &  
on the right hand side show the composition effects. A country’s comparative advantage 
is a major factor influencing the composition effects. We consider factor endowment, 
stringency of environmental regulations, and trade openness as factors affecting the 
comparative advantage (Antweiler et al., 2000; Cole and Elliott, 2003). A 
capital-abundant country will specialize in capital-intensive production, whereas a 
labor-abundant country has a comparative advantage in labor-intensive goods. Therefore, 
a country with a higher capital-labor ratio tends to have higher emissions because 
capital-intensive goods are associated with higher emissions (Cole and Elliott, 2003). 
This effect is captured by the terms with ( )/ itK L  and terms with ( )itLRK /  and/or 
itRS . 
At the same time, a country with relatively more stringent regulations has a 
smaller comparative advantage in capital (pollution) intensive goods because production 
would be constrained by these regulations. Therefore, even if countries have a 
comparative advantage in capital (pollution) intensive goods (i.e., a higher capital-labor 
ratio), the comparative advantage is weakened and emissions would decrease in 
                                                  
10 The predicted probabilities are controlled for SO2 and CO2. The value for BOD emissions is not 
controlled because we are not able to obtain statistically significant results in the probit estimation. 
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high-income countries. The ( / )it itK L S⋅  term in the equation reflects this effect. 
In addition, an increase in trade encourages an increase in the production of 
capital-intensive goods in countries with a comparative advantage in these goods and a 
decrease in the production of capital-intensive goods in countries with a comparative 
disadvantage in capital-intensive goods (see the explanation of the KLE in footnote 1). 
This is captured by ( / )it itRK L T⋅  and 2( / )it itRK L T  terms.  
On the other hand, an increase in trade might encourage a shift in the production 
of capital-intensive goods from countries with more stringent environmental regulations 
(higher income countries) to countries with less stringent environmental regulation 
(lower income countries). This effect (see the explanation of the ERE in footnote 1) is 
captured by the terms with itRS . 
2.2.2  Income Equation 
Following the endogenous growth literature (Mankiw et al., 1992; Frankel and 
Romer, 1999), we control for trade openness, capital–labor ratio, population, 
and human capital in the income equation. The income equation is: 
2 1 1 2 3 4 5 2ln ln ln ln( / ) ln lnit it it it it it itS c S T K L P Schβ β β β β ε−= + + + + + +   
2 2 2 ,it i itε η ν= +        (2) 
where P is the population, Sch proxies human capital investment based on school 
attendance years, and 2ε  is an error term and consists of an individual country effect 
2η  and a random disturbance 2ν .  
2.2.3  Short-Term and Long-Term Effects and Trade-Induced Elasticity 
Short-Term Effect 
We can decompose the terms in equation (1) into two groups as follows. One is 
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the scale-technique effect ( itY ) and the other is the composition effect ( itC ).
11 
[ ] ititititititit HWKYOTOOHSSY &16151413232 αααααα +++++=   (3) 
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Equation 4 is divided into two parts: one with terms including itT , which 
captures the effect of trade openness on the composition effect through the capital-labor 
effect and/or the environmental regulation effect, and another one without terms 
including itT . 
The first part of equation 4 is the direct effect of trade, and the latter is the 
indirect effect of trade. We name the former the Direct Trade-Induced Composition 
Effect ( itTC ) and the latter the Indirect Trade-Induced Composition Effect ( itOC ). This 
reflects the indirect effect of a trade-induced change in income on emissions. Once the 
environmental regulations in a country become more stringent following an increase in 
income, that country loses its comparative advantage in capital-intensive goods. Thus, 
TCit and OCit are expressed as follows: 
[ ]
[ ]
2
7 8 9
2
10 11 12
( / ) ( / )
( / ) ,
it it it it it it
it it it it it it it
TC T RK L T RK L T
RS T RS T RK L RS T
α α α
α α α
= + ⋅ +
+ ⋅ + + ⋅ ⋅
   (5) 
[ ]24 5 6( / ) ( / ) ( / ) .it it it it itOC K L K L K L Sα α α= + + ⋅     (6) 
                                                  
11 For simplification, we focus on the terms except 1c , 1 1ln itEα −  and the error term. Although 
discussions based on the decomposition are provided, we note that the decomposed effects are imputed 
instead of observed. For example, one could consider the case in which a higher K/L also leads to higher 
energy inputs, and there may not be compositional effects. Hence K/L may capture a technique effect, as S 
does. Similarly, a higher S may also induce structural shifts due to non-homothetic demand (Echevarria, 
2008) that move demand to cleaner service–type sectors. Hence, S may have little relationship with 
regulation at all but may have a compositional effect. 
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Here, we consider the effect of a one- percent increase in trade intensity. SSTσ  is 
the trade elasticity of emissions, driven by the scale-technique effect through 
trade-induced changes in income.12 It is derived from (1) and given in (7). In the same 
way, STCσ  is the trade elasticity of emissions driven by the direct composition effect. It 
is derived from (5) and given in (8). Finally, SOCσ  is the trade elasticity of emissions 
driven by the indirect composition effect through trade-induced changes in income.13 It 
is derived from (6) and given in (9). It should be noted that we use the short-term trade 
elasticity of income, which is calculated from the income equation as β2, to obtain these 
elasticities.  
( ) ititSST SS 232 2 βαασ +=        (7) 
( )
[ ] [ ]( )
10 11 12 2
2 2
7 8 9 10 11 12
2 ( / )
( / ) ( / ) ( / )
S
TC it i it
it it it it it it it
RS RK L RS
RK L RK L RS RS RK L RS T
σ α α α β
α α α α α α
= + +⎡⎣
⎤+ + + + + + ⋅ ⎦
 (8) 
( ) ititSOC SLK 26 )/( βασ =        (9) 
As we can see from equation (5), the effect of an increase in trade intensity on 
emissions in (8) is decomposed into two effects: the direct effect of trade intensity and 
the indirect effect of trade intensity through changes in income. We define SITCσ  and 
S
DTCσ , respectively as the elasticities that represent these effects.  
( ) ititiitSITC TRSLRKRS 2121110 )/(2 βααασ ++=      (10) 
[ ] [ ]( )2 27 8 9 10 11 12( / ) ( / ) ( / )SDTC it it it it it it itRK L RK L RS RS RK L RS Tσ α α α α α α= + + + + + ⋅
                                                  
12 The superscripts “S” and “L” refer to the short- and long-term effects, respectively. 
13 This elasticity implies an indirect trade-induced composition effect, or, more precisely, a composition 
effect caused by trade-induced income changes that affect the stringency of the country’s environmental 
regulations and that result in a change in the comparative advantage of capital-intensive goods. 
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         (11) 
From these elasticities, the total trade-induced composition effect, SCσ , is calculated as 
S
ITC
S
DTC
S
OC
S
C σσσσ ++= . It should be noted that the total trade-induced composition 
effect used by Cole and Elliott (2003) corresponds to SDTCσ . Hence, they ignore the 
influence of SOCσ  and SITCσ . This might overestimate or underestimate the composition 
effect. Finally, the short-term overall trade openness elasticity of emissions, STσ , is 
calculated as follows: 
S S S S S
T ST OC ITC DTCσ σ σ σ σ= + + +       (12) 
Long-Term Effect 
In the same manner, each of the long-term effects of LSTσ , LOCσ , LTCσ , LITCσ , 
and LDTCσ  can be defined. Considering the lagged term, 1ln −itE , and the long-term 
elasticity of trade openness to income, which is calculated as 2 1(1 )β β−  from equation 
(2), these effects are calculated as follows: 
( ) iiLST SS
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           (17) 
The long-term overall trade openness elasticity of emissions, LCσ , is calculated as 
.L L L L LT ST OC ITC DTCσ σ σ σ σ= + + +         (18) 
 
3. Estimation Strategy and Data 
3.1  Differenced GMM 
Using the same data source for SO2 emissions as do we, Perman and Stern 
(2003) find that a cointegrating relation exists between SO2 emissions per capita, 
income, and income squared for each country. This implies that long-run relationships 
exist among these variables and that the process of adjustment to the long-run 
equilibrium is slow. Since there is a possibility that other variables in our data also have 
long-run relationships, it is appropriate to adopt a model that takes the time factor into 
consideration in our study. 
 To address the dynamics, we adopt a differenced GMM (Arellano and Bond, 
1991). This method has the advantage that it controls for both the long-run relationship 
and any endogeneity problems by including appropriate instrumental variables. We 
include dependent variables before t-2 and predicted values of both trade openness and 
income as instrumental variables.  
3.2 Data 
The data used in Managi et al. (2009) are obtained from different sources. 
We obtain SO2 emissions data from The Center for Air Pollution Impact and Trend 
Analysis (CAPITA) and Stern (2005). This data are superior to other data sets in terms 
of its spatial and temporal resolution and (Stern, 2005), and cover more time and 
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countries than the data used in Cole and Elliot (2003). We also obtained updated CO2 
emissions data and BOD emissions data (Cole and Elliot, 2003). The CO2 data are 
obtained from the Carbon Dioxide Information Analysis Center (CDIAC), and the BOD 
data are obtained from World Development Indicators (WDI).  
As discussed in Cole and Elliot (2003), because emissions data are often 
estimated using engineering functions based on inputs, the engineering assumptions 
may not reflect the true gains from techniques precisely.14 However, our estimates are 
able to adequately capture technique effects since each of these estimates considers 
country and year specific information. For example, in the case of SO2, the sulfur 
release factor is determined by technology information obtained by country and year 
from the International Energy Agency. This information is combined with the sulfur 
content data for refined products and the net production and is used in the final emission 
calculations (Lefohn et al., 1999). The data for CO2 are calculated using CO2 emissions 
factors for individual fuels, which stem from country and year specific estimates of fuel 
use. Since CO2 emissions factors cannot be reduced by end-of-pipe technology, they are 
time-invariant. However, regulations and technology improve fuel efficiency. Therefore, 
these emissions factors are generally updated over time to allow for changes in 
technology and regulations (Marland et al., 2000). On the other hand, the BOD 
emissions data are based on each country’s actual monitoring data, which measures the 
amount of oxygen that bacteria in water consume in breaking down waste (Hettige et al., 
1998).15 Hettige et al. (1998) note that water pollution data are relatively reliable 
because the sampling techniques for measuring water pollution are more widely 
                                                  
14 On the other hand, concentrations data tend to be affected by site-specific factors. For example, SO2 is 
produced from both anthropogenic sources (such as the burning of fossil fuels) and from natural sources 
(such as volcanoes). 
15 This is a standard water-treatment test for the presence of organic pollutants. 
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understood and much less expensive than those for air pollution. The World Bank’s 
Development Research Group updated the data through 2004 using the same 
methodology as Hettige et al. (1998). 
SO2 and BOD have local and transboundary impacts, whereas CO2 is a 
greenhouse gas and has a global impact. For data on SO2 and CO2, we have 
observations for 88 countries covering the period from 1973–2000. For data on BOD, 
we have observations for 83 countries for the period from 1980–2000.16 We are able to 
obtain larger sample sizes because annual data and data for a longer time span are 
available from several different data sources. For example, in case of SO2, our 
emissions data are annual and covers many countries, while Cole and Elliot (2003) 
obtain 5-year data from the United Nations Environment Programme: Environmental 
Data Report 1993-1994, which covers fewer countries. 
Per capita income, which is defined as GDP per capita (measured in real dollars), 
and trade openness are taken from the Penn World Table 6.1. The capital-labor ratio is 
obtained from the Extended Penn World Table. Population and land area data come 
from the WDI. Data on school attainment (years) come from the education data set in 
Barro and Lee (2000), and distances between the country pairs in question (physical 
distance and dummy variables indicating common borders, linguistic links, and 
landlocked status) come from the Center for International Prospective Studies. Table 1 
provides descriptive statistics of our sample. 
 
                                                  
16 A list of countries used in Managi et al. (2009) for SO2, CO2, and BOD is presented in Appendix C, 
available at the online archive. 
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4. Estimation Results 
4.1  Why the Results are Different from Previous Studies 
By applying instrumental variables and using data from more years and countries, 
we find different results from Antweiler et al. (2000) and Cole and Elliott (2003). 
Therefore, it is critical to understand where the differences come from. Both the 
estimation methodology (differenced GMM estimation) and the data used are found to 
be important to our results.17  
First, to explain the difference between our results and Antweiler et al. (2000) and 
Cole and Elliott (2003), we use the results of our replication rather than their 
results,18,19 and compare our scale-technique effect20 and trade-induced composition 
effect ( DTCσ ) with the replicated results. As is shown in Table 2, we obtain somewhat 
different elasticities compared with their original results.  
Second, to clarify how important our instruments are, we apply OLS estimation and 
fixed effect estimation to our data. There, however, may be other factors such as 
autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity that could bias the results of the OLS estimation. 
We obtain different parameter estimates between the OLS and GMM, which might 
imply that we need to take these factors into consideration. In addition, we obtain 
different results between fixed effects and GMM, which also might imply that including 
                                                  
17 The differences in estimation results between our study and the previous studies might be caused by 
changes in data and/or by differences in estimation methods. We intend to identify the sources of such 
differences. 
18 At first, we confirm that we can replicate the results of Antweiler et al. (2001) using their dataset. Then 
since we would like to use the emission data rather than concentration data in order to compare their 
results and those of Cole and Elliott (2003) with ours consistently, we estimate their model using their 
method (fixed effects estimation and the same coverage of the countries and the year) and subset of our 
data. 
19 We are not able to replicate the parameter estimates in Cole and Elliott (2003), mainly because we use 
the different investment data for replication. We are not able to obtain their capital stock. Therefore, we 
use different capital stock variable of Extended penn world table. In addition, we are able to collect data 
from 24 out of 26 countries for SO2, 26 out of 32 countries for CO2, and 25 out of 32 countries for BOD, 
and we are not able to obtain BOD data for 1975-1979. 
20 Note that we calculate the scale-technique effect, not the trade-induced scale-technique effect. 
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instrumental variables has an impact on the results. We present parameter estimates 
in Table 3. 
Third, to consider the effect of updating data, we compare the elasticities estimated 
using the subset of our data corresponding to that in Antweiler et al. (2000) and Cole 
and Elliott (2003) with those using our full dataset. In addition, to consider the effect of 
the difference in the estimation method, we apply fixed effect and differenced GMM. 
Table 4 shows the summary of the elasticities for comparison. We find that the 
difference in estimation method as well as the data used affect the results. Therefore, 
we conclude that it is important to take endogeneity into consideration and to extend 
the data coverage. 
4.2.  Parameter Estimates 
Table 5 presents the results of the differenced GMM with instrumental variables 
estimation of the environmental quality equation for SO2, CO2, and BOD using our full 
dataset.21 In the equations, the Sargan test for overidentifying restrictions and the 
hypothesis of no second-order autocorrelation imply that the instruments used in the 
GMM estimation are valid and that there is no serial correlation in the error term.22 
Table 6 and Table 7 report the short-term and long-term elasticities of trade openness 
on emissions, STσ , Cσ , OCσ , ITCσ , DTCσ  and Tσ , respectively. They are evaluated 
for sample averages of OECD countries and non-OECD countries using the estimated 
parameters. The values calculated with an average of all samples are also reported for 
reference. We obtained statistically significant results for all elasticities.  
The lagged emissions terms for all specifications are statistically significant with a 
                                                  
21 We focus on the estimation results of the environmental quality equation. The estimation results for 
Income equation and trade equation are reported in Appendix A at the online archive. For a robustness 
check, Table 3 provides results for different estimation techniques. Results for NOx are available at the 
online archive. 
22 In the case of BOD, we are not able to pass AR(2) tests, though the t-value is small enough. 
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positive sign and their values are less than one. These results imply that changes in 
explanatory variables, such as trade openness, at a specific point in time would also 
influence emissions after the current period. This indicates that there is an adjustment 
process and that the short- and long-term effects of trade on emissions are different. 
This evidence confirms that we need to use a dynamic model, although previous studies 
do not. Comparing Table 6 to Table 7, we find that the long-term elasticities are larger 
than the short-term elasticities.  
In all of the specifications for SO2, CO2, and BOD, almost all of the variables, 
including the endogenous variables such as trade openness, per capita income, and their 
interaction terms, have statistically significant effects. It is important to note that our 
statistical results for SO2, CO2, and BOD are somewhat different from those in Cole and 
Elliott (2003).  
The sign of S is positive with statistical significance in the SO2 and CO2 estimates but 
negative in the BOD estimates, while the sign of S2 is negative with statistical 
significance in all three estimates. These results indicate that the scale-technique effect 
is negative for BOD and a negative technique effect gradually dominates a positive scale 
effect for SO2 and CO2 as income increases because higher income leads to a greater 
demand for a better environment.  
The first result shows that, in case of BOD, the technique effect dominates the scale 
effect in both developed and developing countries. This might be because the social 
pressure against water pollution is likely to be stronger than that against air pollution. 
In addition, there is some evidence that developing countries use abatement 
technologies for SO2 from developed countries less frequently than those for BOD, 
possibly because of higher costs (Cheremisinoff, 2001). Thus, a technique effect might be 
 21
more likely to dominate a scale effect in the case of BOD. 
To consider the effect of an increase of S on per capita SO2 and CO2 emissions more 
precisely, we calculated the values of 2 32 Sα α+  and STσ  using sample means of 
income in OECD and non-OECD countries. We find that both values are negative for 
SO2 and CO2 in OECD countries but positive in non-OECD countries. In other words, an 
increase in either production or income leads to an increase in emissions in non-OECD 
countries but to a decrease in emissions in OECD countries. Thus, in the average 
non-OECD country, the scale effect dominates the technique effect because of the 
overall lower demand for a better environment due to lower income, whereas in the 
average OECD country the technique effect dominates the scale effect. 
It should be noted that the values of 2 32 Sα α+  and STσ  for SO2 are smaller than 
those for CO2 for both OECD and non-OECD countries. This result may stem from a 
greater awareness of the negative effects of SO2. It is usually hard to perceive the future 
damages caused by CO2, unlike those of SO2. 
The sign of the cross product of KL and S is positive with statistical significance in all 
estimates, making OCσ  positive for all estimates. One reason for this result might be 
that technological changes resulting in stronger comparative advantages in 
capital-intensive goods occur as the production scale increases.23 We find a positive sign 
for KL and a negative sign for KL2 for all estimates, with statistical significance in all 
cases except for KL in the SO2 equation. These results suggest that increases in the 
capital-labor ratio lead to increases in per capita emissions with a diminishing marginal 
effect. 
                                                  
23 An increase of income weakens the comparative advantages in capital-intensive products because of 
stricter environmental policies, but it also strengthens these advantages because of technological changes 
caused by a larger production scale. The sign of this interaction term suggests that the latter dominates the 
former. 
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As the dummies for ratification of the Helsinki and Oslo Protocols are statistically 
significant with a negative sign, the countries participating in international 
environmental treaties are associated with lower SO2 emissions relative to nonratifying 
countries. This indicates that these treaties were effective in reducing SO2 emissions. In 
contrast, the dummies for Kyoto Protocol and Protocol on Water and Health are 
statistically insignificant, although their signs are negative.24 Therefore, there is a 
possibility that these protocols were not effective at reducing emissions within our 
sample period. To account for possible self-selection bias we use predicted 
values from a probit regression; these estimation results are available in 
Appendix B. 
4.3 Environmental regulation effect vs. Capital-labor effect 
With trade intensity increased, a country that has a comparative advantage in 
capital-intensive products is likely to increase its emissions by specializing more in 
these products. Factor endowment, i.e., the KLE, can affect this comparative advantage. 
On the other hand, environmental policy can also affect this comparative advantage. In 
other words, a country which enforces relatively strict environmental policies is likely to 
have a less comparative advantage in capital-intensive goods following an increase in 
trade intensity, thereby decreasing its emissions as its relative production of these 
goods decreases , i.e. the ERE. 
We are able to determine how an increase in trade intensity affects composition 
effects through both the KLE and the ERE by looking at the sign of the following 
                                                  
24 It is notable that we use signature data for the Kyoto Protocol and the Protocol on Water and Health in 
place of ratification data because few countries ratified these protocols within the sample period. As such, 
we may not be able to control for the effect of these protocols appropriately. We therefore report two 
specifications, one with the protocols and the other without them, for each emission. Note that we 
calculate all values, including elasticities, in Managi et al. (2009) using the specifications without these 
protocols. 
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equation, KLE_EREit, which is obtained by taking the first-order partial derivatives of 
equation (1) with respect to T. 
[ ] [ ]2 27 8 9 10 11 12_ ( / ) ( / ) ( / )it it it it it it itKLE ERE RK L RK L RS RS RK L RSα α α α α α= + + + + + ⋅   
         (19) 
As Table 5 indicates, all of the parameter estimates in the above equation are 
statistically significant. Hereafter, since it is difficult to interpret each of the parameter 
estimates, we try only to evaluate the value of the above equation using sample 
averages for both OECD and non-OECD countries by pollutants. It should be noted that 
DTCσ  corresponds to this equation, as is shown in equations (11) and (17). We obtain 
negative values for both KLE_EREit and DTCσ , as is shown in Tables 6 and 7, for OECD 
countries, but we obtain positive values for both KLE_EREit and DTCσ  for non-OECD 
countries over all pollutants. This implies that an increase in trade intensity results in 
a decrease in emissions in OECD countries and an increase in emissions in non-OECD 
countries. Because the sample averages of RS and RKL are larger than 1 in OECD 
countries and are less than 1 in non-OECD countries, we see that developed countries 
have a comparative advantage in capital-intensive production and enforce relatively 
strict environmental policies. Meanwhile, developing countries have a comparative 
advantage in labor-intensive production and enforce relatively lax environmental 
policies. The negative sign of KLE_ERE in developed countries implies that the ERE 
dominates the KLE. On the other hand, the positive sign of KLE_ERE in developing 
countries implies that the ERE dominates the KLE. Thus, we find that the ERE 
dominates the KLE both in OECE and non-OECD countries. 
4.4  Overall Effect of Trade Openness on Emissions 
As already discussed, the short-term and long-term elasticities of the trade-induced 
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scale-technique effect, STσ , for CO2 and SO2 are found to be negative for OECD 
countries but positive for non-OECD countries, while that for BOD is found to be 
negative both for OECD and non-OECD countries. The elasticity of the trade-induced 
composition effect, Cσ , is positive in both cases. From these estimations, following 
results can be summarized: 
(1) The short-term and long-term overall effects of trade openness on emissions, Tσ , 
are negative for all pollutants in OECD countries because the negative 
trade-induced scale-technique effect dominates the positive trade-induced 
composition effect.  
(2) The short-term and long-term overall effects of trade openness are positive for SO2 
and CO2 but negative for BOD in non-OECD countries. This is mainly because the 
trade-induced scale-technique effect and the trade-induced composition effect are 
both positive in the cases of SO2 and CO2. On the other hand, since the technologies 
developed by OECD countries to reduce BOD emissions are available in non-OECD 
countries and these technologies have lower costs, the negative scale-technique 
effect dominates the positive trade-induced composition effect for BOD. 
(3) Trade openness therefore reduces BOD emissions both in OECD and non-OECD 
countries, while it reduces SO2 and CO2 emissions in OECD countries and increases 
them in non-OECD countries.  
(4) The short-term elasticities of the overall effect of trade openness on SO2, CO2, and 
BOD are –0.147, –0.054, and –0.058 for OECD countries, and 0.030, and 0.113, 
–0.004 for non-OECD countries, respectively. On the other hand, the long-term 
elasticities are –2.228, –0.186, and –0.224 for OECD countries and 0.920, 0.883, and 
–0.155 for non-OECD countries, respectively.  
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(5) Looking at the above estimations, we see that the short-term overall effects are 
small for all pollutants and for OECD and non-OECD countries. We also find that 
the magnitude of the long-term overall effects varies. In the cases of SO2 in OECD 
countries and of SO2 and CO2 in non-OECD countries, the difference in the 
short-term and the long-term elasticities is large. In the case of SO2 in OECD 
countries, the scale-technique effects are not offset by the composition effects in the 
long term, whereas in the case of SO2 and CO2 in non-OECD countries, the 
composition effects are added to the scale-technique effects. In the other cases, the 
scale-technique effects are offset by the composition effects, and the difference in the 
elasticities is small. 
(6) As previously presented, we find that the sign of STσ  is negative in OECD countries 
and positive in non-OECD countries for SO2 and CO2. This suggests that there 
might be some turnover level of income at which this sign changes from positive to 
negative as the level of income increases. We would like to determine the average 
turnover incomes of OECD and non-OECD countries respectively using their 
average K/L, RK/L, and T. The average turnover income for SO2 is $24,616 for 
OECD countries and $14,045 for non-OECD countries, while that for CO2 is $29,678 
for OECD countries and $24,732 for non-OECD countries. We find that the average 
turnover income for OECD countries is larger than that for non-OECD countries. 
OECD countries have a comparative advantage in the production of 
capital-intensive goods due to a larger K/L compared with non-OECD countries. 
Hence, OECD countries need a higher income for the technique effect to cancel out 
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the scale effect. We also find that the turnover income for CO2 is larger than that for 
SO2.25  
 
5. Conclusions 
Economists have been analyzing for decades how trade liberalization affects 
environmental quality. However, both the theoretical and the empirical literatures on 
trade, economic development, and the environment are largely inconclusive about the 
overall impact of trade on the environment. Openness to international trade is expected 
to have both positive and negative effects (Grossman and Krueger, 1993; Copeland and 
Taylor; 2005). Previous studies have been unable to estimate the overall impact of trade 
openness on the environment. This study focuses on Managi et al. (2009) and show what 
has been understood in the literature. 
Managi et al. (2009) treats trade and income as endogenous and estimates the overall 
impact of trade openness on the environment using the instrumental variables 
technique. Managi et al. (2009) has analyzed the causal effects of trade openness on SO2, 
CO2, and BOD emissions by using extensive annual data for OECD and non-OECD 
countries.  
The study finds that both the data coverage and the estimation method affect the 
estimation results. Thus, to obtain appropriate estimation results, it is important to 
address the endogeneity problems and to have more data coverage.  
They find that whether trade has a beneficial effect on the environment on average or 
not varies depending on the pollutant and the country. A 1% increase in trade openness 
causes an increase of 0.920% and 0.883% in SO2 and CO2 emissions, respectively, and a 
                                                  
25 For BOD emissions, we are not able to calculate the turnover income since the elasticities of overall 
income are always negative. 
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decrease of 0.155% in BOD emissions in non-OECD countries in the long term. On the 
other hand, the long-term effects for OECD countries are –2.228%, –0186%, and 
–0.224% for SO2, CO2 and BOD, respectively. 
The results also show that there is a sharp contrast between OECD and non-OECD 
countries with regard to SO2 and CO2. Both in the short and long terms, trade reduces 
emissions of these pollutants only in OECD countries. On the other hand, they find that 
trade has a beneficial effect on BOD emissions all over the world in both the short and 
long terms. They also find that there is a distinct difference between short-term 
elasticities and long-term elasticities, implying that it is important to take dynamics 
into consideration. Finally, trade openness influences emissions through the 
environmental regulation effect and capital labor effect. They find that the former effect 
is likely to be larger than the latter effect for all pollutants.  
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Table 1. Descriptive Statistics 
Variable Dimension Obs. Mean SD Min Max 
SO2 emissions per capita kg 2152 15.240 20.312 0.009 153.521 
CO2 emissions per capita tons 2152 3.998 4.452 0.029 23.885 
BOD emissions per capita kg 1159 2.550 2.009 0.004 12.964 
GDP per capita $ 10k 2152 0.785 0.700 0.044 3.329 
Capital labor ratio $ 10k/worker 2152 2.764 2.770 0.010 10.451 
Trade intensity % 2152 64.274 45.129 6.320 439.029 
Population person 2152 4.71E+7 1.47E+8 2.04E+5 1.26E+9 
School attendance years years 2152 5.198 2.793 0.370 12.250 
Land area km2 29147 2.09E+6 3.76E+6 57.000 3.16E+7 
Distance km 29147 4640.028 2740.452 19.434 12351.260
Border [–] 29147 0.025 0.157 0 1 
Linguistic [–] 29147 0.143 0.350 0 1 
Landlocked [–] 29147 0.181 0.405 0 2 
Source: Managi et al. (2009) 
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Table 2. Replication of Cole and Elliott (2003) (Fixed effects) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note:  *, ** and *** indicate ”significant” at the 10% level, the 5% level and the 1% level, respectively.  
Elasticities are evaluated at sample means. 
Effect  SO2 CO2 BOD 
Reproduced directly from Cole and Elliott (2003) –1.7** 0.46*** –0.06*** 
Scale-technique effect 
Our Replication of Cole and Elliott (2003) –0.491 0.094*** –0.031 
Reproduced directly from Cole and Elliott (2003) 0.3*** 0.049* –0.05*** 
Trade-induced composition effect ( DTCσ ) 
Our Replication of Cole and Elliott (2003) 0.631* 0.151** 0.112* 
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Table 3. The determinants of SO2, CO2, and BOD Emissions per capita (OLS, fixed effects, and differenced GMM) 
Note:  Values in parentheses are t–values. *, ** and *** indicate “significant” at the 10% level, the 5% level and the 1% level, respectively. In 
differenced GMM, trade openness, per capita GDP, and its square term are instrumented for using predicted openness, predicted per capita GDP, 
and predicted its square term, respectively. 
Variable SO2 (OLS) 
SO2 
(Fixed effects)
SO2 
(GMM) 
CO2 
（OLS） 
CO2 
( Fixed effects) 
CO2 
(GMM) 
BOD 
（OLS） 
BOD 
( Fixed effects )
BOD 
(GMM) 
1ln itE −  – – 
0.68*** 
(90.02) – – 
0.60*** 
(28.38) – – 
0.58*** 
(21.52) 
S 1.35*** (3.12) 
1.074*** 
(4.06) 
1.11*** 
(7.77) 
2.99*** 
(9.09) 
1.41*** 
(9.67) 
0.84*** 
(6.21) 
2.36*** 
(7.63) 
–0.065 
(–0.30) 
–0.95*** 
(–6.96) 
S2 0.54* (1.80) 
–0.77*** 
(–4.60) 
–0.96*** 
(–15.62) 
–0.055 
(–0.24) 
–0.36*** 
(–3.90) 
–0.42*** 
(–4.63) 
–1.06*** 
(–4.66) 
–0.18 
(–1.24) 
–0.14* 
(–1.94) 
K/L 0.92*** (8.57) 
0.35*** 
(5.57) 
0.028 
(0.70) 
0.74*** 
(9.08) 
0.28*** 
(7.98) 
0.078** 
(2.17) 
0.20** 
(2.56) 
0.45*** 
(8.63) 
0.22*** 
(7.24) 
(K/L)2 –0.044** (–2.17) 
–0.029*** 
(–2.83) 
–0.033*** 
(–5.56) 
–0.048*** 
(–3.10) 
–0.015** 
(–2.59) 
–0.013*** 
(–3.63) 
–0.065*** 
(–3.92) 
–0.042*** 
(–4.53) 
–0.045*** 
(–9.81) 
(K/L)S –0.44*** (–2.99) 
0.079 
(1.04) 
0.28*** 
(8.94) 
–0.26** 
(–2.36) 
–0.022 
(–0.54) 
0.089*** 
(2.72) 
0.31*** 
(2.68) 
0.086 
(1.25) 
0.20*** 
(6.76) 
T 0.0092*** (6.85) 
0.0026** 
(2.52) 
0.0018*** 
(7.96) 
0.011*** 
(10.84) 
0.0029*** 
(4.97) 
0.0026*** 
(20.93) 
0.0077*** 
(6.23) 
0.0029** 
(2.53) 
0.00050* 
(1.90) 
T relative (K/L) 0.0038 (1.10) 
0.0013 
(0.76) 
–0.0016** 
(–2.37) 
–0.0024 
(–0.90) 
–0.0010 
(–1.12) 
–0.0014** 
(–2.55) 
–0.0065*** 
(–2.75) 
–0.0077*** 
(–6.22) 
–0.0048*** 
(–6.41) 
T relative (K/L)2 –0.0019* (–1.89) 
0.0010** 
(2.13) 
0.0011*** 
(6.12) 
–0.0016** 
(–2.01) 
0.00012 
(0.46) 
0.00064*** 
(6.42) 
0.0014** 
(2.01) 
0.0017*** 
(4.76) 
0.0019*** 
(5.99) 
T relative S –0.011*** (–4.65) 
–0.0037** 
(–2.49) 
–0.0011** 
(–2.27) 
–0.0046** 
(–2.50) 
–0.00083 
(–1.00) 
–0.00065* 
(–1.76) 
0.0014 
(0.82) 
0.0034*** 
(2.94) 
0.0023*** 
(5.45) 
T relative S 2 0.00031 (0.52) 
0.0020*** 
(5.90) 
0.00075*** 
(12.18) 
–0.0010** 
(–2.30) 
0.00023 
(1.27) 
0.00036*** 
(4.21) 
–0.00024 
(–0.60) 
–0.000077 
(–0.31) 
0.00017*** 
(3.13) 
T rel (K/L) rel S 0.0033** (2.48) 
–0.0025*** 
(–3.80) 
–0.0015*** 
(–11.00) 
0.0040*** 
(3.98) 
–0.00017 
(–0.47) 
–0.00074*** 
(–4.48) 
–0.00014 
(–0.16) 
–0.00079 
(–1.64) 
–0.0013*** 
(–6.07) 
Time trend –0.020*** (–7.06) 
–0.017*** 
(–10.56) – 
–0.0061*** 
(–2.78) 
0.0050*** 
(5.78) – 
–0.015*** 
(–5.34) 
–0.0076*** 
(–4.31) – 
Constant 40.84*** (7.09) 
34.24*** 
(11.03) 
–0.0067*** 
(–9.06) 
9.86** 
(2.26) 
–10.76*** 
(–6.30) 
0.0010*** 
(3.27) 
28.36*** 
(5.11) 
14.82*** 
(4.29) 
–0.0010 
(–1.41) 
Observations 2152 2152 2152 2152 2152 2152 1159 1159 1159 
Number of countries 88 88 88 88 88 88 83 83 83 
R squared 0.52 0.34 – 0.81 0.39 – 0.70 0.19 – 
Sargan test – – 75.99 – – 79.84 – – 67.46 
AR(1) – – –4.44*** – – –3.52*** – – –3.38*** 
AR(2) – – –0.02 – – –0.94 – – 1.75* 
 Source: Managi et al. (2009) 
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Table 4. Comparison of scale-technique effect and trade-induced composition effect using different data and estimation methods 
Data Type 
Antweiler et 
al. 
Cole and Elliott 
This study 
 
SO2 SO2 CO2 BOD SO2 CO2 BOD 
Scale-technique 
effect 
–0.380** –0.491 0.094*** –0.033 –0.108*** 0.662*** –0.117 
Fixed 
effect
Trade-induced 
composition 
effect 
0.108* 0.631* 0.151** 0.112* 0.002* 0.058*** 0.019**
Scale-technique 
effect 
0.544*** 0.326* 0.580 0.383 –0.317*** 0.168*** –0.367*
GMM Trade-induced 
composition 
effect 
–0.015*** –0.527* 0.090*** 0.067 –0.057* 0.037* –0.018*
Note: *, ** and *** indicate “significant” at the 10% level, the 5% level and the 1% level, respectively. Antweiler et 
al. stands for the estimation using the subset of our data with the same data coverage in Antweiler et al. (2001), Cole and Elliott 
stands for the estimation using the subset of our data with the same data coverage in Cole and Elliott (2003), and this study 
stands for updated data in this study. 
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Table 5. The determinants of SO2, CO2, and BOD Emissions per capita (Differenced GMM) 
Note:  Values in parentheses are t–values. *, ** and *** indicate “significant” at the 10% level, the 5% level 
and the 1% level, respectively. Trade openness, per capita GDP, and its square term are instrumented for using 
predicted openness, predicted per capita GDP, and predicted its square term, respectively. 
Variable SO2 (Protocol) SO2 
CO2 
（Protocol） CO2 
BOD 
（Protocol） BOD 
1ln itE −  
0.67*** 
(70.81) 
0.68*** 
(90.02) 
0.60*** 
(31.72) 
0.60*** 
(28.38) 
0.57*** 
(26.73) 
0.58*** 
(21.52) 
S 1.10*** (7.82) 
1.11*** 
(7.77) 
0.82*** 
(6.95) 
0.84*** 
(6.21) 
–0.79*** 
(–4.91) 
–0.95*** 
(–6.96) 
S2 –0.907*** (–8.33) 
–0.96*** 
(–15.62) 
–0.43*** 
(–5.47) 
–0.42*** 
(–4.63) 
–0.20** 
(–2.02) 
–0.14* 
(–1.94) 
K/L 0.013 (0.32) 
0.028 
(0.70) 
0.079** 
(2.13) 
0.078** 
(2.17) 
0.17*** 
(4.91) 
0.22*** 
(7.24) 
(K/L)2 –0.031*** (–3.66) 
–0.033*** 
(–5.56) 
–0.014*** 
(–3.52) 
–0.013*** 
(–3.63) 
–0.043*** 
(–10.57) 
–0.045*** 
(–9.81) 
(K/L)S 0.27*** (5.22) 
0.28*** 
(8.94) 
0.095*** 
(3.16) 
0.089*** 
(2.72) 
0.21*** 
(6.10) 
0.20*** 
(6.76) 
T 0.0014*** (4.33) 
0.0018*** 
(7.96) 
0.0024*** 
(14.41) 
0.0026*** 
(20.93) 
0.00050 
(1.43) 
0.00050* 
(1.90) 
T relative (K/L) –0.0013* (–1.66) 
–0.0016** 
(–2.37) 
–0.0014***
(–2.65) 
–0.0014** 
(–2.55) 
–0.0039*** 
(–5.77) 
–0.0048*** 
(–6.41) 
T relative (K/L)2 0.0011*** (4.19) 
0.0011*** 
(6.12) 
0.00066***
(5.92) 
0.00064*** 
(6.42) 
0.0017*** 
(6.32) 
0.0019*** 
(5.99) 
T relative S –0.0010* (–1.79) 
–0.0011** 
(–2.27) 
–0.00059* 
(–1.83) 
–0.00065* 
(–1.76) 
0.0018*** 
(4.24) 
0.0023*** 
(5.45) 
T relative S 2 0.00074*** (8.01) 
0.00075***
(12.18) 
0.00037***
(4.60) 
0.00036*** 
(4.21) 
0.00023** 
(2.11) 
0.00017*** 
(3.13) 
T rel (K/L) rel S –0.0015*** (–6.07) 
–0.0015***
(–11.00) 
–0.00077***
(–4.49) 
–0.00074*** 
(–4.48) 
–0.0013*** 
(–5.14) 
–0.0013*** 
(–6.07) 
Helsinki 
Protocol 
–0.097*** 
(–4.01) – – – – – 
Oslo Protocol –0.040*** (–2.93) – – – – – 
Kyoto Protocol – – –0.0025 (–0.60) – – – 
Protocol on 
Water and 
Health 
– – – – –0.010 (–1.20) – 
Constant –0.0067*** (–11.22) 
–0.0067***
(–9.06) 
0.0012*** 
(3.14) 
0.0010*** 
(3.27) 
–0.0014** 
(–2.55) 
–0.0010 
(–1.41) 
Observations 2152 2152 2152 2152 1159 1159 
Number of 
countries 88 88 88 88 83 83 
Sargan test 76.29 75.99 76.27 79.84 70.39 67.46 
AR(1) –4.41*** –4.44*** –3.45*** –3.52*** –3.27*** –3.38*** 
AR(2) –0.01 –0.02 –0.94 –0.94 1.74* 1.75* 
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Table 6. Short Term Trade Elasticity (Differenced GMM) 
Elasticity SO2 CO2 BOD 
S
STσ  –0.176*** –0.058*** –0.144* 
S
OCσ  0.146*** 0.046*** 0.130***
S
ITCσ  0.000* 0.000* 0.000***SCσ  
S
DTCσ  
0.029*
–0.117*
0.003*
–0.043* 
0.086* 
–0.044*
OECD 
S
Tσ  –0.147** –0.054* –0.058* 
S
STσ  0.006*** 0.012*** –0.034* 
S
OCσ  0.008*** 0.003*** 0.010***
S
ITCσ  0.000* 0.000* 0.000***SCσ  
S
DTCσ  
0.023*
0.015* 
0.111*
0.098* 
0.030* 
0.020* 
Non-OECD 
S
Tσ  0.030** 0.113* –0.004* 
S
STσ  –0.016*** 0.008*** –0.067* 
S
OCσ  0.031*** 0.010*** 0.037***
S
ITCσ  0.000* 0.000* 0.000***SCσ  
S
DTCσ  
–
0.026*
–0.057*
0.047*
0.037* 
0.019* 
–0.018*
All data 
S
Tσ  –0.042** 0.055* –0.048* 
Note:  *, ** and *** indicate “significant” at the 10% level, the 5% level and the 1% level, 
respectively. 
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Table 7. Long Term Trade Elasticity (Differenced GMM) 
Elasticity SO2 CO2 BOD 
L
STσ  –10.908*** –2.388*** –1.239* 
L
OCσ  9.012*** 2.301*** 1.114***
L
ITCσ  0.028** 0.008* 0.002***LCσ
L
DTCσ  
8.679**
–0.361**
2.202*
–0.107* 
1.014* 
–0.102*
OECD 
L
Tσ  –2.228** –0.186* –0.224* 
L
STσ  0.378*** 0.513*** –0.289* 
L
OCσ  0.495*** 0.126*** 0.089***
L
ITCσ  –0.000* –0.000* 0.001***LCσ
L
DTCσ  
0.543*
0.048* 
0.369*
0.243* 
0.135* 
0.045* 
Non-OECD 
L
Tσ  0.920** 0.883* –0.155* 
L
STσ  –0.979*** 0.348*** –0.572* 
L
OCσ  1.891*** 0.483*** 0.314***
L
ITCσ  0.001** –0.000* 0.001***LCσ
L
DTCσ  
1.937*
–0.176*
0.575*
0.092* 
0.273* 
–0.042*
All data 
L
Tσ  0.736** 0.923* –0.299* 
Note:  *, ** and *** indicate “significant” at the 10% level, the 5% level and the 1% level, 
respectively. 
 Source: Managi et al. (2009) 
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Appendix A. Model of Income and Trade Openness 
A.1  Income Equation 
Table A-1 presents the results of the GMM estimation using instrumental 
variables for the income equation (2) using the same sample as in equation (1).26 In the 
equation, the Sargan test for overidentifying restrictions and the hypothesis of no 
second-order autocorrelation imply that the instruments used in the GMM estimation 
are valid and that there is no serial correlation in the error term. The lagged GDP per 
capita terms for all specifications are significant with a positive sign. This indicates that 
there is an adjustment process and that we should use a dynamic model even though the 
previous studies did not. Trade intensity has a statistically significant positive effect for 
all specifications. This indicates that trade openness contributes to the increase in GDP 
per capita. This is consistent with the literature (Frankel and Romer, 1999; Dollar and 
Kraay, 2003; Noguer and Siscart, 2005).27 
                                                  
26 The results for both gravity and income are in line with the general findings in the literature. 
27 However, this relationship is the subject of a large and somewhat controversial literature (for example, 
see Rodriguez and Rodrik, 2001). We estimate several different specifications to obtain the trade 
elasticities and confirm that use of these elasticities would not alter our overall elasticities’ signs in (12) 
and (18). 
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Table A-1. Income Equation 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note:  Values in parentheses are t–values. *, ** and *** indicate “significant” at the 
10% level, the 5% level and the 1% level, respectively. Trade openness is 
instrumented for using predicted openness. 
Sample used for 
SO2 & 
CO2 
BOD 
1ln itS −  
0.95*** 
(366.31) 
0.73*** 
(872.58) 
lnT  
0.05*** 
(30.92) 
0.06*** 
(79.86) 
ln( / )K L  
–0.05***
(–31.76) 
–0.01*** 
(–10.92) 
ln P  
–0.01* 
(–1.90) 
–0.01*** 
(–12.11) 
ln Sch 
–0.001**
(–2.92) 
–0.04*** 
(–30.31) 
Constant 
0.0004***
(4.06) 
0.01*** 
(80.23) 
Observations 2152 1159 
Number of 
countries 
88 83 
Sargan test 86.32 79.47 
AR(1) –4.64*** –3.27*** 
AR(2) –1.53 0.29 
 
Source: Managi et al. (2009) 
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A.2  Trade Openness Equation 
The endogeneity of trade is a familiar problem from the empirical literature on 
income and openness (e.g., Noguer and Siscart, 2005). Thus, instrumental variables 
estimations are used in Managi et al. (2009), following Frankel and Rose (2005). The 
gravity model of bilateral trade offers good instrumental variables for trade because 
these are exogenous yet highly correlated with trade. We use indicators of country size 
(population, and land area) and distances between the pairs of countries in question 
(physical distance and dummy variables indicating common borders, linguistic links, 
and landlocked status). The equation is: 
3 1 2 3 4
5 6 3
ln( / ) ln ln
ln( )
ij i ij j ij ij
i j ij ij
Trade GDP c Dis P Lan Bor
Area Area Landlocked
γ γ γ γ
γ γ ε
= + + + +
+ ⋅ + +   (A-1) 
where Tradeij is the bilateral trade flows from country i to country j, GDPi is the Gross 
Domestic Product of country i, Disij is the distance between country i and country j, Pj 
is the population of country j, Lanij is a common language dummy that takes a value of 
1 if two countries have the same language and 0 otherwise, Borij is a common border 
dummy that takes a value of 1 if countries i and j share a border and 0 otherwise, Area is 
land area, and Landlocked is a dummy that takes a value of 1 if one country is 
landlocked, 2 if both countries are landlocked, and 0 otherwise, and 3ε  is an error 
term. 
The result is presented in Table A-2. We construct IV for openness as follows. A 
first-stage regression of the gravity equation is computed. Then, we take the exponential 
of the fitted values of bilateral trade and sum across bilateral trading partners as follows: 
 ln( / )ij ij Exp Fitted Trade GDP⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦∑     (A-2) 
This fitted openness variable is added as an additional IV for the GMM. 
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Table A-2. Gravity Equation 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note:  Values in parentheses are t–values. *, ** and *** indicate “significant” at 
the 10% level, the 5% level and the 1% level, respectively. 
ln(Tradeij/GDPi) 
Parameter 
estimates 
ln(Distanceij) 
–0.92*** 
(–43.77) 
ln(Populationj) 
0.85*** 
(88.92) 
Languageij 
0.59*** 
(13.44) 
Borderij 
0.57*** 
(5.71) 
ln(AreaiAreaj) 
–0.22*** 
(–40.81) 
Landlockedij 
–0.41*** 
(–11.54) 
Constant 
–2.45*** 
(–12.43) 
Observations 29147 
R squared 0.25 
 Source: Managi et al. (2009) 
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Appendix B. The Effect of Ratifying Multinational Environmental Agreements 
We apply the probit model to the decisions of individual countries to ratify 
international environmental agreements following Beron et al. (2003) and Murdoch et al. 
(2003). Let the dependent variable yi = 1 for countries that ratify the international 
environmental accord and yi = 0 for nonratifying countries. The unknown parameters 
can be estimated with a standard probit model. In modeling the Helsinki and Oslo 
Protocols, we define yi to equal 1 for countries that ratified the relevant protocol, 
whereas for the Kyoto Protocol and the Protocol on Water and Health28, we define yi to 
equal 1 for countries that signed the relevant protocol because there are few countries 
that ratified these protocols within our data period.29 
We consider two factors that influence these decisions. These factors are 
environmental quality as a normal good and the cost of compliance with the protocol. A 
country that ratifies or signs the protocol can be seen as a member of a group of nations 
that is voluntarily providing a public good. This is because additional demand for 
environmental quality comes with higher level of wealth. We use a country’s average 
GNP per capita, lagged five years, to test this relationship; a positive sign is expected in 
the probit model. 
Countries that ratify or sign these protocols are required to achieve some 
emissions level. Lagged emissions levels should therefore influence the cost of 
complying with the protocol. That is, we assume countries with higher emission levels 
incur greater costs than countries with lower levels, implying that the net benefits from 
ratifying or signing a protocol are lower for high-emission countries. Therefore, we 
expect lagged emissions (as a proxy for compliance cost) to be negatively related to the 
ratification or signature decision. 
Although there are several more variables included in the literature, we limit 
ourselves to two variables owing to multicollinearity and limited degrees of freedom. 
We use data from 20, 19, 172, and 16 nations for the Helsinki Protocol, Oslo Protocol, 
                                                  
28 The Protocol on Water and Health to the 1992 Convention on the Protection and Use of Transboundary 
Watercourses and International Lakes is the first international agreement adopted specifically to attain an 
adequate supply of safe drinking water and adequate sanitation for people and to effectively protect water 
used for drinking. 
29 The Kyoto Protocol on reducing the emissions of carbon dioxide was adopted on 11 December 1997, 
and 84 countries signed in 1998 or 1999, whereas the Protocol on Water and Health was adopted in 1999, 
and 36 countries signed in 1999 or 2000. 
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Kyoto Protocol, and Protocol on Water and Health, respectively. Samples used in the 
estimations of the Helsinki Protocol, Oslo Protocol, and Protocol on Water and Health 
are taken from the participant countries in the UN Economic Commission for Europe. 
Around 60%, 70%, and 65% of the countries participated in each protocol, respectively. 
Samples used in the estimation of the Kyoto Protocol are taken from the participant 
countries in the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, where 
around 46% of the countries signed the protocol. The probit estimation results are 
presented in Table B.  
For the Helsinki Protocol, Oslo Protocol, and Kyoto Protocol, we obtained 
statistically significant results that are almost in line with the expected sign. The only 
exception is the sign of lagged emissions for the Kyoto Protocol. On the other hand, we 
are not able to obtain a statistically significant result for the Protocol on Water and 
Health. Predicted probabilities are calculated and are then imputed to the original 
Helsinki, Oslo, and Kyoto Protocol variables. 
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Table B. Probit Estimation 
Note:  Values in parentheses are t–values. *, ** and *** indicate “significant” 
at the 10% level, the 5% level and the 1% level, respectively. 
Variable Helsinki Oslo Kyoto 
Water and 
Health 
Lagged per capita GNP 
0.40** 
(2.38) 
0.20** 
(1.96) 
0.067***
(4.54) 
–0.045 
(–0.70) 
Lagged emissions 
–0.0005*
(–1.70) 
–0.0004*
(–1.78) 
0.0009* 
(1.86) 
–0.60 
(–0.31) 
Constant 
–6.08** 
(–2.10) 
–2.36 
(–1.42) 
–0.87***
(–6.38) 
1.18 
(1.11) 
Observations 20 19 172 16 
Log-Likelihood Value –5.26 –7.02 –93.90 –9.95 
Pseudo R-Squared 0.60 0.36 0.16 0.06 
 
Source: Managi et al. (2009) 
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Appendix C. Data and the List of the Countries Used for Managi et al. (2009) 
List of the countries used is provided in Table C.  
 
Table C.  Lists of the Country in This Study 
North America Uruguay Belgium Gambiaa 
Canada Venezuela Britain Ghana 
USA Asia Cyprus Kenya 
Latin America Bangladesh Denmark Malawi 
Argentine China Finland Malib 
Barbados Hong Kong France Mauritaniab 
Bolivia India Greece Mauritius 
Brazil Indonesia Hungary Mozambique 
Chile Japan Iceland Niger 
Colombia Korea Ireland Rwanda 
Costa Rica Malaysia Italy Senegal 
Dominica Nepal Netherlands Sierra Leoneb 
Ecuador Pakistan Portugal South Africa 
El Salvador Philippines Romania Togo 
Guatemala Singapore Spain Tunisia 
Guiana Sri Lanka Sweden Uganda 
Haitib Thailand Switzerland Zambia 
Honduras Middle East Africa Zimbabwe 
Jamaica Iran Beninb Oceania 
Mexico Israel Burundib Australia 
Nicaragua Jordan Cameroon Fiji 
Panama Syria Central Africa New Zealand 
Paraguayb Turkeya Congo  
Peru Europe Egypt  
Trinidad and Tobago Austria Ethiopia  
Note:  a Not included in SO2 and CO2 specification. b Not included in BOD 
specification 
 
Simple scatter plots are portrayed in Figure C, where there are not rough correlation 
between emissions and trade (Managi et al., 2009). 
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SO2 emissions per capita against Trade openness     CO2 emissions per capita against Trade openness      BOD emissions per capita against Trade openness 
 
SO2 emissions per capita against GDP per capita      CO2 emissions per capita against GDP per capita      BOD emissions per capita against GDP per capita 
 
SO2 emissions per capita against Capital–labor ratio    CO2 emissions per capita against Capital–labor ratio    BOD emissions per capita against Capital–labor ratio 
 
GDP per capita against Trade openness              Capital–labor ratio against Trade openness          GDP per capita against Capital–labor ratio 
Fig. C.  Simple scatter plots of data 
Note: Vertical axis and horizontal axis are expressed as follows. In the case that the
figure title is “A against B”, vertical axis and horizontal axis corresponds to A and B, 
respectively. SO2 emissions per capita, CO2 emissions per capita and BOD emissions 
per capita are measured in kg, tons and kg, respectively. Trade openness, real GDP per 
capita and Capital–labor ratio are measured in %, $ and capital per worker, respectively.
0 
100 
0 100 200 300 400 
0
20000
40000
0 20000 60000 100000
0 
40000 
80000 
0 100 200 300 400 
0 
20000 
40000 
0 100 200 300 400 
0
10
0 20000 60000 100000
0 
10 
20 
20000 60000 100000
0 
100 
0 20000 60000 100000 
0
10
0 10000 20000  30000 
0 
10 
20 
0 10000 20000  30000 
0 
100 
0 10000 20000 30000 
0
10
0 100 200 300 400 
0 
10 
20 
0 100 200 300 400 
 
 48
Appendix D. The results for NOx 
We obtain NOx emissions data from The Emission Database for Global 
Atmospheric Research (EDGAR) for 1990, 1995, and 2000, meaning that the data are 
available for only three years. The decision to ratify the Sofia Protocol30 occurred in 
1988 and the first year of data is from 1990, so we did not use a probit model. Instead, 
we use a simple dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if the country has already 
ratified the 1988 Sofia protocol and 0 otherwise. Table D-1 presents the estimated 
parameters of equation (1) using differenced GMM, while Table D-2 presents the 
trade-induced elasticities evaluated at the sample means. As is shown in Table F-2, the 
elasticities of the trade-induced scale-technique effect, STσ , are statistically significant 
with a positive sign in all cases. This result indicates that the scale effect dominates the 
technique effect. The elasticities of the trade-induced composition effects, Cσ , and of 
the overall effect, Tσ , are insignificant. 
 
                                                  
30 The Kyoto Protocol on reducing the emissions of carbon dioxide was adopted on 11 December 1997, 
and 84 countries signed in 1998 or 1999, whereas the Protocol on Water and Health was adopted in 1999, 
and 36 countries signed in 1999 or 2000. 
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Table D-1. The determinants of NOx Emissions per capita (Differenced GMM) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note:  Values in parentheses are t–values. *, ** and *** indicate “significant” at the 
10% level, the 5% level and the 1% level, respectively. Trade openness, per capita 
GDP, and its square term are instrumented for using predicted openness, predicted 
per capita GDP, and predicted its square term, respectively. 
Variable NOx （Protocol） NOx 
1ln itE −  
–0.80 
(–1.64) 
–0.90* 
(–1.88) 
S 2.73* (1.73) 
2.79* 
(1.71) 
S2 3.05* (1.72) 
3.47* 
(1.97) 
K/L 0.18 (0.34) 
0.24 
(0.46) 
(K/L)2 0.19** (2.12) 
0.21** 
(2.45) 
(K/L)S –1.73** (–2.04) 
–1.95** 
(–2.36) 
T 0.0073* (1.67) 
0.0075* 
(1.76) 
T relative 
(K/L) 
0.018 
(1.37) 
0.015 
(1.18) 
T relative 
(K/L)2 
–0.0071 
(–0.73) 
–0.0096 
(–1.06) 
T relative S –0.023** (–2.47) 
–0.022** 
(–2.34) 
T relative S 2 –0.0019 (–0.47) 
–0.0033 
(–0.88) 
T rel (K/L) rel 
S 
0.011 
(0.85) 
0.016 
(1.29) 
Sofia Protocol 0.18 (1.24) – 
Constant 0.29*** (5.27) 
0.29*** 
(5.19) 
Observations 69 69 
Number of 
countries 69 69 
Sargan test 5.40 5.69 
AR(1) – – 
AR(2) – – 
 
Source: Managi et al. (2009) 
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Table D-2. Trade Elasticity (Differenced GMM) 
Short Term Long Term 
Elasticity 
NOx NOx 
STσ  0.482* 1.951* 
OCσ  –
0.404**
–
1.636** 
ITCσ  –0.002* –0.007* Cσ  
DTCσ  
–0.819
–0.413 
–2.172
–0.217 
OECD 
Tσ  –0.337 0.092 
STσ  0.049* 0.200* 
OCσ  –
0.022**
–
0.090** 
ITCσ  –0.000* –0.001* Cσ  
DTCσ  
–0.346
–0.324 
–0.098
–0.170 
Non-OECD 
Tσ  –0.297 –0.061 
STσ  0.130* 0.525* 
OCσ  –
0.085**
–
0.343** 
ITCσ  –
0.001**
–0.002* C
σ  
DTCσ  
0.695 
–0.609 
–0.505
–0.320 
All data 
Tσ  –0.565 –0.141 
Note:  *, ** and *** indicate “significant” at the 10% level, the 5% level and the 1% level, 
respectively. 
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Appendix E. Environmental Kuzets Curve Hypothesis 
 
We intend to explore whether the EKC hypothesis is supported.316 For this reason, we 
derive itit SE ∂∂ /  and itit SE 22 / ∂∂  using equation (1) as follows: 
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We find that the values in (E-1) evaluated at the means of the OECD and non-OECD 
samples are negative and positive for both SO2 and CO2, respectively, and negative for 
BOD. We also find that the values in (E-2) evaluated at the means of the OECD and 
non-OECD samples are negative for all emissions. Our results indicate that the EKC 
hypothesis is supported for SO2 and CO2 within our samples but not for BOD.32 
 
 
                                                  
31 The uses of per capita GDP and its quadratic to capture both scale and technique effects are consistent 
with some of the studies on the EKC. However, we note recent studies applying a cubic factor or a 
nonparametric method to test the EKC. Additionally, we may only estimate the compound effect of the 
three effects (Grossman and Krueger, 1995). See also Tsurumi and Managi (2010). 
32 Turning point incomes for SO2 and CO2 are $ 12623 and $ 18283, respectively. 
